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Abstract: A research approach, active since three decades, is sketchy described. Its aim is to 
clarify, starting from the phenomenology of explaining-understanding interactions followed 
along years within groups of students, two mutually correlated theoretical and practical nodes: 
i) how to restructure the discipline presentation (e.g. basic physics and math) to be 
longitudinally resonant with students’ gradual appropriation, in both understanding and 
motivation; ii) how to infer a cognitive model able to account for success (insuccess) in the 
school active mediation, but also to validate planning and support strategies invariant across 
age spans and different content areas. A first approach to basic mechanics, able to coherently 
and successfully evolve to higher formal levels, will exemplify model activation at school.    
Introduction: this paper    
This presentation aims to offer a brief survey of a research line which since about thirty years has evolved  
along two parallel, strictly correlated strands: a cognitive modeling able to account for what actually happens 
(does not happen, we would like to happen) in science and mathematics classrooms, since kindergarten to 
beginning of university; and an effective and efficient restructuration of both discipline concepts and teaching 
practices able to resonate, in understanding and motivation, with the astonishing potentialities humans exhibit at 
the beginning of their cultural life (and then appear to gradually “loose”). The results of both strands,  
substantially unpublished apart from occasional excerpts, are now being systematically organized according to 
their “reciprocally mirroring” features. Here a few aspects of the research method and of the inferred cognitive 
model will be first outlined; then a flash-example will be given about the approach to the long term cognitive 
path that allows for a longitudinally resonant appropriation of basic mechanics. As a conclusion, some hints 
from neurocognitive research will be recognized as resonant ones with the interpretations and with the 
suggestions stemming from this independent approach to thought facts. 
               It is obvious that such a complex and multilateral research line, active for such a long time, is deeply 
involved and indebted with a great variety of theoretical views and research results (say, from presocratic 
philosophers to current cognitivist and/or curricular proposals). However, a regrettable choice is a forced one: to 
prevent this paper body to be almost totally taken by quotations and references, substantially no reference will 
be given here - even when some Names will (necessarily) appear. The choice will be remedied for in more 
expanded contexts; experts in the field will anyhow identify implicit acknowledgements diffused in the text. 
 
1) The research: aims, methods, framing assumptions    
 The research started in the late ‘70s with an ambitious, yet rather undeterminate perspective: to radically 
confront with the diffused failure of the scientific-mathematic education by directly and deeply inter-acting with 
“normal” students in “normal” schools (since the 3 yrs of kindergarten up to university level), and with their 
“normal” teachers; this, for long time enough to elicit the dynamic features underlying the widespread lack of 
personal understanding and motivation, both necessary to successful appropriation of basic scientific culture.  
               The goal was then, since the beginning and along the years, one of exploring on one side the implicit 
cognitive potentialities girls and boys bring to school; on another side - but at the same time – one of trying out 
the deep  rearrangements discipline structures can/must undergo in order to gradually and successfully fit, as 
through a resonance dynamics, with the students’ potentialities themselves; finally, to check across time (up to 5 
years, in some cases, with the same students) which long term interaction strategies between developing 
cognition and self-modulating scientific culture appear to be mostly effective and efficient to reach a cultural 
appropriation personally meaningful, socially relevant and open to cooperation ad evolution culture 
appropriation. At the same time the research methodology was also shaped by matter of fact circumstances: 
researchers, with long term scientific backgrounds in physics, biology, mathematics, psychology, were fully 
immersed in the project and “scientifically” confronting with cognitive and pedagogical issues in literature; 
Italian Schools allowed for systematic presence of researchers in the classrooms, totally sharing teaching 
strategies and teaching interactions in investigated (and connected) areas with in-charge teachers; variations of 
the standard approaches need always to be such to fully guarantee test-students to reach better performances in 
standard controls at the end of learning cycles; a teaching “technique” of setting up the conditions for 
systematic, meaningful students discussions, then of real-time analyzing them in correlation with written tasks 
to address the finalized interactions, was first developed in these years, revealing itself as a crucial key to 
research evolution; the possibility to “survive” in scientific departments by periodical (and not so frequent) 
publications about science teaching results and proposals was a big help; … and so on. 
               Confronting with unsatisfactory field checks of so many action/interpretation features peculiar to 
available learning theories (Piaget, Bruner, Vygotskij … et al, to start with), the research went on by slow 
accumulation and organization of varieties of phenomenological evidence, always mirroring into hypothetical 
modeling features. And the envisaged model always had to satisfactorily account for the short-intermediate-long 
term observed cognitive dynamics: addressed as they were by strategically active adult intervention and 
support, but fully involving the understanding-learning subject in all his/her personal characters. 
               Several basic aspects of such a phenomenology-based cognitive modeling were quickly 
interfering/merging with the basic framing assumptions which in some sense had a-priori inspired research 
methods and goals: since some point, a selected set of assumptions-confirmed-by-results was therefore able to 
act as an (evolving) framework within which to articulate the research strategies, together with their continuous 
confrontation with classroom data and worldwide hints/results. Here it is just possible to (almost randomly) 
sketch a few of such model-framing criteria, all gradually confirmed by direct evidence and as such implicated 
in the actual form of the model itself. In “apodictic” format, a satisfactory cognitive model should then: 
- exhibit interpretive (in observed contexts), predictive (in new contexts) and effective interaction-driving 
features all along the evolution of life-and-school experience of students; 
- account for varieties and complexities in the knowing subjects, in the known objects, in the cognitive fits 
correlating such poles via the proposed cultural interfaces – without systematically removing variety and 
complexity into “ignorance” and/or “anomaly”; 
- account, along development times (and since very early ones), both for different (parallel) levels of cognitive 
sophistication always tuned to purpose and context, and for a (correlated) inner dynamical impulse to cognitive 
self-expansion (<all men by their very nature strive to better know>, already according to Aristoteles); 
- offer definite help to come out of supervening “problems” (theory-and/or-action centered); 
- account for the basic similarities (across the wide span of sophistications) connecting students’ teachers’ and 
researchers’ cognitive strategies, this way  promoting and supporting reciprocal empathic “recognition”;   
- value the fact that thinking is at any level intrinsically multilateral (then sometimes incoherent, yet most of the 
times globally self consistent), according to a vision quite similar to Wittgenstein’s <game of games>; 
- accept the deep constraint (always a controversial though quite an obvious one) that <the game of games can 
not be totally formalized> - then explicitely represented (formalizing itself is a game among others!);  
- account for the observed discretization-articulation-correlation of the cognitive games according to their 
action/language/purpose features and structures, recognizing and making explicit the founding role of 
Democritos’ realization that <language is the shadow of action> (and viceversa!); 
- account for the substantial continuity in different thought modes - from perceiving to modeling, from 
referential to formal ones - all structured around common, basic strategies; in correlation, to account for the 
observed long term, interlaced refinement of strategies themselves from kindergarten to university, and to 
highlight – in this perspective – effective and efficient recovery strategies whenever needed.   
- ……………………………………………………………………………… 
- to make the most of the very fact that natural experience, natural language, natural thinking, natural 
strategies, natural knowing … sit down at the roots of all kinds of thought differentiations, developments and 
sophistications: even more important, that they shape also the crucial patterns of metacognitive and cognition 
validating dynamics. 
               (There are several reasons to make such reasonable framing criteria of a proposed modeling as much 
explicit as possible: last but not least, the role they do have in making acceptable and exploitable by “normal” 
teachers a proposed theory of  thinking, so often repelling them in its technically schematic features).  
 
2) The “cognitive resonance” model: general features    
Without following the indented evolution of model core and surface features, without attempting to argue about 
their reciprocal consistency and support, and without pursuing any completeness, it will now be schematically 
outlined some model peculiar character. It is worth to remark again that the model itself, in its endeavour to 
mirror thought dynamics, is not looking for a hierarchic (quasi-deductive) construction: rather, its descriptions 
of thinking substantially acknowledge for a rich variety of potentially correlated and potentially structured 
available modes, which always get their specific form(at)s according to activation-and-purpose modalities. (See 
below for a physics-based analogy). Model characters, therefore, do not respond to rigid reciprocal roles, but are 
in some sense all-always co-determining, with variable reciprocal weights, thinking dynamics.  
               Cognitive thinking is deeply rooted into a few, crucial, dynamical “facts”: quite evident as such across 
emergent cognitive behaviours, quite hard to be sharply disentangled at “local” levels (individual, contextual, 
temporal, cultural, evolutive … ones). Let’s go through. 
               2.1) At the basis of any kind of conceptual thinking (so to say) stands the huge, sophisticated, 
substantially “black-box” construction of the perceptual (sensory-motor) thinking: in all its hardware vs 
software, syntactic vs. semantic , functional vs. structural … dynamical features. We know not so much of such 
a system (by the way correlating humans’ to animals’ cognitive behaviours): however all we know and all we 
observe confirms on one side the observed continuity and reciprocal embedment between conceptual and 
perceptual “worlds”; on another, crucial, side the reasonable hypothesis of a syntactic and semantical 
parasiting by conceptual cognition of the perceptual structure itself. 
               2.2) In a first approximation, continuity and embedment can be resolved into some main aspects: i) 
conceptual and perceptual thinking, as much as they are phenomenologically distinguishable, do exert a 
continuous  influence each one on the other, their interaction-interference (normally a very constructive one) 
being only in part explicitely controlled at the <game of games> level; ii) there is a direct continuity between the 
two thinking modalities: in particular referential thinking, articulated as it is into permanent 
objects/systems/states (and so on) and permanent phenomena/properties/transformations (and so on), can 
exploit its potentialities of “evolutive advantage” only if the two modalities are reciprocally tuned (actually, 
continuously re-tuning each one vs. the other); iii) sensation has the severe limitation that correlations among 
variations are not directly observable, as crucial as they are to biological success: a move forward, already 
present in very “simple” animal structures, is then a “purposeful mix” of sensation, pattern 
construction/recognition and memory  which allows the perceptual cognition of “complex” animals (and of  
humans) to perform directly (let’s say implicitely) in quite sophisticated ways; iv) the typically human (crucial) 
move, commonly quoted as “abstraction”, appears then in its core features as one of literally objectifying 
correlations themselves: i.e. one of cognitively handle and hierarchize them according to a systematic and 
coherent metaphoric strategy, that projects the external-correlations world onto the powerful perceptual-
cognitive structure already tuned to handle external objects, phenomena and so on: the enormous “evolutive 
advantage” being then one of transferring the exploitation of correlations (interpreting, planning, considering 
alternatives, producing hypotheses, and so) onto the functionally, structurally and strategically well dominated 
plane of perceptually-driven world interactions; v) once any new level of abstraction is subsumed this way into 
the already available cognitive machinery it starts experiencing, in turn, strong “metaphoric advances” by the 
powerful expansive dynamics which is responsible (at evolutive as well as developmental level) for the  
bological pressure to optimize performance: such an intrinsecally constructive mechanism (sometimes labeled 
as a “bootstrap” one) making, on the other hand, practically impossible (unproductive) any attempt to rigidly 
classify and rigidly handle different “forms of thinking”; vi)  in particular, the metaphoric mode of thinking 
allows for the onset of an explicit, again quasi-objectual, metacognition: always working somehow “counter-
stream” in respect to the “logical” constraints embedded in cognitive dynamics, and emerging to awareness in 
the format of recognized “impossibilities”: from non contradiction, to impossible total formalization of the game 
of games, to incompatibilities in checking completeness and coherence, and so on; all stressing the unavoidably 
self referential character of the global dynamics; vii) again in particular, the metaphoric (abstract) thinking mode 
can be recognized as internally structured according to some crucial features already evident in the perceptual 
one: for instance, elementary “prototypes” of various level are gradually correlated (in evolution as in 
development) to each other according to flexible structures, accounting this way in a maximally economic way 
(as pointed out by Mach) for the overwhelming variety of contexts; for instance, the intrinsic structuration 
according to “fields”, “subfields”, “general fields” … and so on in particular knowledge reflect (sometimes even 
quite clearly) the original metaphorizing phenomenologies; and so on. 
               2.3) The evidence for such characters of basic cognitive dynamics gradually and coherently emerges 
from direct, careful, long-time, different individuals’ observation in different contexts. (It is a peculiar feature of 
all levels of animal perception the “primitive” relevance which is given to the cognitive articulation of any 
“change” into the meta-categories of  variance vs. invariance: so that the very fact that cognitive invariants 
subjectively emerge as “research results” across the long times and variegated contexts is just coherent with the 
basic “universal” features claimed by the cognitive model itself). On the other side a cognitive dynamics like the 
one which has been just outlined would easily result in quite unstable, explosively differentiated cognitive 
systems (and systems of systems). Actually, what works (also) as a stabilizing cognitive subsystem, able to keep 
at reciprocal convergence growth, use and structuration within and between individuals, at the same time 
exhibits deep marks stemming from the dynamics itself (this way confirming the basic model assumptions): it is 
now urgent to qualify the variety of cognitive roles assumed by language – as well as by generally “symbolic” 
processes. Let’s see some of them. i) Various symbolic (or “pre-symbolic”) forms of thinking-and-behaving, up 
to “protolanguages”, have been documented in animals  (and plausibly more could be uncovered): the access to 
language and symbolism appears then as a natural cognitive potentiality  best developed in appropriated 
“cultural” environments. ii) Though an evolutionary account of human symbolic and linguistic processes (as 
hard as it is) would be of crucial interest in cognitive modeling, it will not be attempted here. iii) What is by 
now recognized in human languages as “universal” basic structure(s) of syntax and grammar (Chomsky’s 
perspective) has very evidently to do with a basic structural scansion of external-and-meaningful reality 
features, to cognitively reorganize them in purposeful formats. In other words, in the language reality appears as 
“projected” (forced) into a discretizing categorization which privileges stable object/systems (nouns), their 
recognizable and variable “properties” (adjectives), their movements and/or transformations (verbs) according 
to various modalities (adverbs), the space-time-causal links at the roots of recognizable phenomena (syntactical 
terms and verbal forms) … and so on: it is not difficult to identify across the structure of grammars and 
syntaxes a quasi-isomorphism (a dynamical resonance, to be more specific) with the basic structures of 
referential cognition (perceptual and/or conceptual as it is). iii) Language (and symbolization) perform 
therefore, together with the communication one, a variety of crucial cognitive roles: e.g. on one side they act to 
stabilize the cognitive dynamics (within and between individuals; most importantly at the level of cultural 
transmission, where cognitive categories and strategies are implicitely shaping the developing mind by their 
resonant effectiveness); on the other side it allows for variationality and expansivity of the cognitive dynamics 
itself, in particular supporting the driving roles of metaphors and hypotheses strategies. iv) In particular, it is 
clear since the oldest written documentation that sensory-motor metaphors do deeply structure the roots of 
“abstract” (and “scientific”) cognition, besides the ones of “natural” (and “poetic”) discourse: so the conclusion 
of a mathematical proof has to be “seen”, as a behavioural guess has to be “sensible” … and so on. v) Still in 
particular, it is probably by the mediation of language metaphoric power that the basic “logical” metaphor 
stemming from space images of two dimensional sets has taken its roots and relevance, as it is until now 
documented by the space-time-movement words which characterize elementary logics in all languages. vi) And 
so on. 
               2.4) The tortuous paths of the metaphorization processes, eventually leading to handle aspects of the 
complex world of correlations as quasi-isomorphic to parts of the (also very complex) objectual and 
phenomenic world, become more evident by a parallel study of the (variously) abstract components of our 
language, and of their intriguing appropriation by cognitively developing young people. There is no room here 
to go across an analysis of this kind of processes, where the strong a-priori constraints of given “relevant” world 
characters, together with given “correspondingly appropriate” language and behaviour modes, powerfully act on 
cognitively natural pre-dispositions: to eventually enforce the internal resonance habit characterizing our ways 
to think, ways to act, ways to speak … <ways to live>, in Wittgenstein’s words. Just three typical examples, as 
banal as they may appear, to address the attention to this problem (a crucial one to understand cognitive 
development within cultural pressure). i) <Length> is an “abstract noun” which our grammar hands as an 
“object noun”: we say <the length (of) …, this length, a great length … etc>. It is obvious that no “length-
object” does exist: rather, length is one of the ways (actually, a prototypical one) by which we can characterize 
concrete objects (technically, an “attribute”, a “variable”, …). Why a quasi-object noun, then? A sensible 
(though complex) answer is indeed possible within the framework of the model. Here, just a crucial remark: in 
its substantivation the word <length> actually refers to the fact that by selecting a particular way-to-look-at the 
considered object among the many available ones (looking-at by length: rather that by weight, by price, by 
beauty, by symbolic meaning …) it is indeed possible to realize a stable, meaningful resonance between a 
subjective cognitive “predisposition” and an objectual invariant “property”.  Exactly what happens with the 
perceptually successful apprehension of a physical object: in both cases the resonance process reinforcing its 
two referents.  And the “objective length” will then become visible, measurable, comparable, structurable, and 
so on. (ii) <Force> is, again, an “abstract noun” which our grammar hands, again, as an “object noun”: we say 
<the force, two forces, a great force, … a force acting on … etc>. It is again obvious that no corresponding 
object exists: rather, this substantivation (again a referential-and-metaphoric one, as it occurs in everyday 
language) implies the ability to “see” the invariance of a complex correlation experienced in a variety of 
contexts: where the perceptual feeling of a bodily <doing force> is first isolated, then connected to the variety of 
co-occurrences in the (necessarily) involved external system(s). Again, transferring the concrete doing-force 
contexts to quasi-objectual cognitive contexts, where any doing-force is materialized and represented as a 
“something”, happens indeed to be a “winning” cognitive strategy: already present in natural thought-language 
strategies when, quite late in cultural history, it got to be “formalized” (see below for more details). iii) What 
about <number>? Again a cognitive, linguistic, symbolic, formal … quasi-objectual mark to characterize the 
resonance between a way-to-look-at (i.e. looking by numerosity and nothing else at a delimited group of 
discrete objects) and an objectual property of a piece of the world. Again, much more than that: the possibility 
to directly handle an internal construct not only able to resonate in trustable way with a variety of external 
contexts-conditions, but endowed with the potentiality to become (just by its character of faithful duplication of 
objectual properties) the cornerstone of a self consistent cognitive world able to successfully superpose its 
structure onto the objectual one.  
               2.5) It may be by now clear that this kind of modeling tends to look at cognitive dynamics as one 
characterized by an internal “duplication” of features, and correlations among features: somehow “mirroring”, 
or “simulating”, the external ones that cognition itself is able to isolate (to “identify”) then to “recognize” as 
relevant ones, then worth to be appropriated. In this always entangled construction-and-use process, the ability 
of cognition to modulate in a continuous way the “mixing” between perceptual conceptual and metacognitive 
dynamics, in referential and metaphoric modalities, plays the central role. And dynamics itself appears to be 
setup (as much constrained than activated) by a resonance-searching and resonance sensing, far-deep 
biological “engine”: one able to detect and to pursue the reciprocal adjustment-fit between aspects of external 
and internal worlds (internal-to-external, internal-to-internal, external-to-external features …) by the same 
universal criteria by which a living being is supported and addressed in his good/well vs. evil/harm judgements 
and behaviours. Radically: the internal feeling driving us (most of the times successfully) to maximize cognitive 
internal and external resonance(s) in local as in global contexts (“cognitive fitness”, so to speak) has the similar 
roots and sensing apparatus of the feeling which drives us to maximize our overall wellness, to which cognitive 
fitness is in turn a crucial instrument. And all the by now well acknowledged correlations between cognitive, 
emotional and values worlds strongly confirm this way to look at cognition itself.  
               In this perspective it is also evident that the host of “representational” strategies characterizing the 
modulations of our culture-driven cognitive strategies (from symbolic to linguistic, from iconic to formal ones) 
are themselves driven by selective (reciprocal) resonance criteria: where the crucial node pivoting the cognitive 
“duplication” game is localized in its inner (software and hardware, so to speak) schematism-and-partiality 
features. Only parts (better, projections) of the complexity can in fact be successfully duplicated into meaningful 
and manageable internal entities: in any case at the price of a schematization, directly stemming from the 
structures of the “simulating hardware and software” by which duplication itself is setup.  
                Obviously such a continuous, intrinsically redundant duplication-simulation process is by itself 
subject to uncoherences: internal ones (emerging when different patterns “should” be reciprocally adjusted to fit 
external pressure); and external ones (emerging when a pattern internally elaborated according to criteria “other 
times” successful does not fit any more to a new kind of external evidence). Since the earliest times of 
metacognitive reflection, “philosophers” have noticed and discussed such an intriguing  problem, and proposed 
ways to come out of it. An extreme one (from Plato and Aristoteles to Leibnitz and Hegel to some contemporary 
epistemologists) is to postulate some kind of a-priori granted correspondence between “absolute thought” forms 
and “absolute world” features: the problem being then one of  gradually “uncovering” a satisfactory 
(asymptotically true) match between the two. An alternatively extreme one, which has been first icastically 
worded by Protagoras (then substantially misinterpreted, then dismissed along the centuries) is the one assumed 
by this cognitive model, in its intrinsically dynamical characterization: i) any “discourse” (logos: part-aspect of 
the cognitive system), due to its origin from contextual-and-metaphoric inferences projected and restructured to 
fit into a uniform “language” structure, is by its very nature potentially contradicting other parts-aspects of 
cognition, when developed only according to its internal coherence; ii) to overcome such a quite normal 
difficulty, the normal success strategy is always one to produce (to invent ex-novo) a “more powerful” (kretton) 
and more complex discourse (mostly, by new metaphoric strategies), featuring the possibility to reframe the 
emerged contradiction as a particularization of different but not incompatible ways-to-look-at: the ones which  
by now are coherently inserted and controlled within the new discourse structure; iii) the validity judgement 
about such a new discourse cannot be pursued looking for criteria (“principles”) somehow external to the global 
cognition (and values, and emotions) system in its present dynamical configuration, but has to be 
problematically found – time after time – within itself (metron anthropos, man is the scale for all things,  
Protagoras was claiming: with associated, multimillennian scandal). Clearly a lot of the evolution of scientific 
thought can be understood (also) this way; while one might again remind Wittgenstein’s claim that we cannot 
play a game of giving game of games a definite form; or even Godel’s claim that to check for completeness and 
coherence of a “formalized” system it is always necessary to activate a “more powerful one” including it. 
               2.6)  The characterization of the model could (should) continue, but it is now time to sketch some of its  
implications. Before doing it, three other peculiar features will be just evocated by proposing a physical analogy 
to the model itself. The object-like (“machine”-like) representation of cognitive dynamics (or parts of it), quite 
rarely coupled to self-critical attitudes, is as old as human documented reflection: from Zuang-Zi (V century 
B.C.) to Fodor and to neural-networks simulations, the effort to explore thought by assimilating it to peculiar 
thinking products has proposed an impressive series of quasi-models. (Several times quite “useful” ones indeed 
to the progress of reflection). The image being proposed here is just one among other “physical/objectual” 
images (biological images, like the one comparing cognition features to living/evolving organisms and species, 
are probably the best fitting ones – even if they often appear as complex and badly known as the “thing” they try 
to reflect). Let’s take the way contemporary physics is modeling an aspect of reality identified as a “field” (a 
“quantum field”, in particular). It is a “something” assumed to be physically real (actually the basic physical 
root of all kinds of observed reality), but impossible to be assimilated to the perceptually based conception of 
“object”. Further, endowed with strongly correlated characters of internally structured “content” and externally 
structured “interactivity” (we can model the field by inferring structure from interactions and/or by predicting 
interactions through structural features). Now a field features, among others, some interesting “reality” 
characters in its structure/interaction, easily extended to cognition dynamics: its reality is actually a potential 
(“virtual”) one, in the sense that it is manifesting only through the variety of possible internal and external 
interactions summing up its very “nature”; it is a very redundant one, as compared to our technical possibility to 
exhaustively model the internal elements/relationships “closing” up to account for structure/interaction 
characters; it is, finally, a highly hierarchized one, according to quasi invariant modes, but also subject to strong 
contextual rearrangements, according to the features time-by-time “evocated” by the meta-constraint that 
external inter-actions (with a different field) are driven by reciprocally coherent features. It is clear that the 
proposed image (extending to almost all the “technicalities” which qualify a quantum field) can be even more 
confusing not-physicist people: however it also appears that the thought attitude/tendency/ability to 
metaphorically reinvest its most sophisticated products into (unavoidably partial) self-modeling is just another 
confirmation of the proposed cognitive model, and of the self-limitations it coherently accepts.              
3) From the model: a longitudinal, resonant approach to disciplines (e.g. phys & math) 
The metaphorizing cognitive dynamics, crucial as it is to culture appropriation and exploitation, is indeed a 
natural one – i.e. accessible to all normal humans, up to high degrees of sophistication. It is not, however, a 
spontaneous one, as compared to the complexity of the cultural articulation characterizing our ways of social 
life, and to the compressed times of individual development. Therefore beyond implicit appropriation of the 
everyday basic culture under the pressure of everyday full immersion in it, explicit cultural appropriation along 
the pathways of strategically defined metaphorizations needs to be purposefully addressed and mediated to 
stimulate and to support cognitive autonomy (in contrast to substantial training/conditioning): and this 
could/should happen within the school social context in a prototypical way. Averroes was saying that any 
individual intellect needs, to develop, to be <fecundated> by the general intellect – culture, in our words – 
through the mediation of a purposeful, mirroring, empathic (“resonant”) interaction with a more developed 
individual intellect; while the contribution of any (mortal) individual intellect to the evolution of the (immortal) 
general intellect occurs by a peculiar character of the former one: its attitude to creative imagination. The 
cognitive model being sketched here substantially subscribes Averroes’ insight. But this means that schooling 
has to be planned according to long-term-evolving cognitive paths (“conceptual corridors” in Confrey’s words): 
paths which the research has eventually proved to be resonant ones with the ever evolving cognitive 
potentialities of students, and whose appropriation by teachers makes able to address and support by resonant 
interactions the “conceptual trajectories” of groups and of individuals. (Notice, by the way, the everlasting 
power of the “path within landscape” metaphor to account for cognitive growth/evolution, since presocratic 
philosophers to Ludwig Wittgenstein, and beyond). And just at this point the path of the research here accounted 
for is merging its two strictly correlated threads: an effective cognitive model to actively foster/induce cognitive 
resonance; an effective (re)shaping of  conceptual paths within disciplines landscapes, to actually meet students’ 
resonance potentialities. Three examples of (still general) discipline-centered strategic choices implicit in the 
model will now be briefly outlined under the heading of strategic teaching questions: what about physics vs. 
mathematics (so to say, factual thinking vs. formal thinking)? what about scientific modeling (a specific “as if” 
thinking), e.g. in physical contexts? what about the “pre-requirements” always claimed to be necessary to any 
definite understanding? 
               3.1) From the point of view of this model, the basic opposition of physical vs. mathematical thinking is 
well outlined already by Aristoteles (this way anticipating a sound epistemological answer to Wigner’s worries 
about the <unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics …>). According to Aristoteles himself, mathematics and 
physics as specialized endeavours respond to two different, basic ways-to-look-at the same world phenomena: 
the former aiming to isolate  the structural features (at the origin, substantially space-like ones) embedded in all 
observable contexts (in this sense universal, then “abstract” ones), and gradually organizing them as in an 
autonomous quasi-objectual, this way totally coherent, fictitious “world”; the second striving to schematically-
but-faithfully “duplicate” the essential features of classes of phenomena by “fitting” universal structures already 
in mathematical (logical) formats (whenever and whichever available) with context specific and ad-hoc 
“formalized” characters, all being structured by “causal” (again metaphorically expressed) links.  Obviously 
what comes out are, in both cases, complex sets of “hardly entangled” structures of metaphoric elements and 
relationships substantially “simulating” space ones; structures which are culturally handled and represented in 
quasi-objectual formats, that as such substantially prevent (instead of favouring) directly “intuitive” resonant 
appropriation. On the basis of neurocognitive evidence Dehaene notices that even basic arithmetic, as it has 
been culturally structured, is cognitively very difficult (basic physics all the same): but an insightful cognitive-
and-cultural mediation, acknowledging and making (also metacognitively) transparent the state of facts, actually 
can do the job to gradually drive individual thinking to a resonant appropriation of cultural ways-to-look-at, 
factual (scientific) and formal (mathematical) ones.  
               3.2) Let’s take the example of physics-peculiar modeling strategies (something quite similar can be 
said about other scientific areas). At the origin stands the basically perceptual world scansion (see above) into 
“permanent systems” and “permanent variables”, then into systems interactions and parallel variables 
relationships and correlations, then into “permanent phenomena and phenomenologies”, eventually exhibiting 
causal links (as space-time metaphorized): all being quite satisfactorily (so to say) mirrored by the syntax-and-
semantics (mainly) constructive interference featured by natural languages, and by (independent) 
symbolic/iconic representations. (For instance a cognitively crucial node, impossible to be fully articulated here, 
is rolled up into the very primitive notion of “form”, powerfully linking and entangling to the cognitive 
treatment of systems the handling of “directly insensible” relationships between variables - this way projected 
towards “objectual” metaphorization). What physics is doing is just to systematically and coherently exploit 
such a “natural” approach (and making such a point explicit is a powerful key to successful “teaching” 
mediation at all ages). Three basic obstacles, however, actually make the cognitive approach to the disciplinary 
modeling to be felt by many people as quite an obstructed one: i) on one side, <reality itself is not fully 
separable> (as D’Espagnat notices about quantum physics): systems interactions and variables relationships 
actually are totally interlaced in nature, and quite sophisticated strategies have to be at work (nothing to do with 
Piagetian prescriptions) to de-interlace (then to re-interlace) them in emblematic contexts; ii) on another side, 
for “good” (!) cognitive reasons our formalization systems have evolved in quite different ways on the two 
fronts of interacting systems and “function-like” correlations of variables: this way our physics manuals (as our 
experts’ physical thinking) are now mainly filled up by “computable formulas” correlating variables and 
parameters variations, while the parallel (crucially underlying) systems interactions are mostly taken in charge 
by linguistic statements (easily misinterpretable as they are by their seemingly loose, “un-formalized” format); 
iii) finally, physics modeling is mainly presented within context-adjusted, supposedly emblematic framing 
conditions: without accepting the burden to explicit the complex cognitive networks that (already in “common” 
experience/knowledge) correlate and hierarchize our perception-based, action-based, … prototype-based, … 
generalization based, principles based … cognitive-and-operational behaviours. 
               3.3) It is a quite widespread commonplace in discussions about schooling problems the accent which is 
placed on the “pre-requirements” (always on the side of pupils!) supposedly necessary to the success of any 
“further step” in the teaching-learning interaction itself. There is (obviously) a sound basis to such a worry: the 
powerful path-metaphor to account for cognitive evolution, already evocated above, being clearly substanciating 
it. But a metaphor, as partially significant and successful as it may be, is always a partial one: in this case, able 
to trap theory (remember about Piaget’s discretized-and-aligned developmental stages) as well as practice into 
substantially blind cognitive assumptions. It is not this way that cognitive dynamics actually works 
(conditioning does!). Much more a sound one is indeed the Vygotskij’s basic metaphor: “local” cognitive 
progress in social context being seen as an emersion out of a “possible-proximal-development region”, where 
some element of “new” knowledge has coagulated to explicit and stable appropriation by an active and finalized 
adult intervention taking into account all the implicit as well as explicit “pre-conditions” of the learner. It is 
clear from what has been said that the  model presented here substantially accepts (and develops) such a view. 
To end up, just three comments. i) Rich, potentially evolving proximal development regions are not for nothing: 
they have, in turn, to be continuously fostered/enlarged (also in their idiosyncratic characters) by responsible 
and competent “teaching” mediation (quite often, after some years of schooling proximal development areas 
appear as burn out by their exploitation in explicit instruction, without the renewal the enrichment and the 
growth which only would allow for further cognitive growth). ii) A “region” is a region (at many many 
dimensions, in thinking space!) and not a line interval: so, one can get out of any definite region by a wealth of 
different moves resulting in different “acquisitions”. In other words: cognition, as a resonance-mediated 
continuous (continuously evolving) activity, is by itself a locally highly non-linear process (icastically typified 
by the Platonic myth of “recognizing”): and all the attempts to reduce it to quasi linear sequences of 
state/transformation “unit” steps miserably fail at the matter-of-facts level (remember Gagné’s “curricular” 
proposals). All this might let teachers’ task to appear as an almost  impossible one (then forcing them to assume 
regressive, “strictly deterministic” views/actions), without the support of a cognitive model and of a discipline 
restructuration taking explicitely into account the long-term cognitive evolution, and its necessity to be 
insightfully supported: two correlated aspects of a dynamics which can be satisfactorily controlled/addressed 
according to resonant (instead of dissonant) assumptions.  
4) An example of “mediated resonance”: the approach to “rules” for basic mechanics    
Typically, the teaching approach to basic physics stresses two (correlated) “metacognitive” aspects: on one side 
the serious “dangers” unavoidably connected with messing up physics understanding by any attempt to involve 
in it bodily experience; on the other side the intrinsically discontinuous relationship separating “common” 
(misconceiving) cognitive habits from “scientific” (correctly conceptual) ones. And a “philosopher” like 
Parmenides was just first opening the endless story of doxa (opinion) vs. epìsteme (true knowledge) opposition, 
dominating western culture up to present times. The general assumptions of this cognitive model are just the 
opposite ones: to better illustrate them, let us briefly go through to the very first steps of an actually resonant 
path to appropriate basic mechanics from the beginning of schooling to full formalization.   
- One starts by the explicit analysis of static situations: quite naturally occurring references to motion situations  
are well accepted all along the initial path, but explicitely memorized-and-postponed (actually, they will be later 
resumed and treated according  to a strict, successful extending-analogy to static ones). 
- The physically crucial notion of “body” is first assumed in its literal, experience-laden reference: then 
gradually extended to encompass any physical “system” in its fully material variety of identifications. It is 
crucially important to learn to “mirror” body features vs. objects ones. 
-  Isolated “forces” do not exist: the basic notion (physical fact) being the state of “doing force” of a definite 
system, this way involving at the same time and in correlated ways its internal structures and its external 
interactions. 
- To “do force” by a definite region of its boundary, a system always needs an external, “antagonist” system 
counter-doing force in the same region: in any of the possible “force-regions” of a given system interacting with 
others, the different “doing force” are at global equilibrium. If the interaction is just with one system, the two 
“doing force” can be described as two equal-and-opposite actions – then as two abstract entities <forces>. This 
way two forces can be seen as equal ones even if originating from totally different systems. 
- Any system “doing force” must interact by at least two boundary regions: in abstract format, the sum of all the 
forces done by any system has to be zero (if the system is interacting in just two regions, the exerted forces are 
opposite ones). 
- The state of doing force always de-forms the system in reference with its “natural equilibrium” state: this is 
true in various (even very different) ways for both internal structure and external shape and features. As it de-
dormed by interaction the system always gains or gives up “energy” (see below) according to modes which are 
correlated to its doing force. 
- “Forces” as abstract entities characterizing systems interactions can be added up to correspond to observed 
interaction features if all systems are doing force along a common direction (if “forces are parallel ones”). This 
allows to measure any force action by “equilibrating” it with a number of  “unit forces” defined by the 
reproducible deformation of a standard interacting system. 
- (According to the previous rules) forces are “transmitted” across systems: in the case of a “chain” of 
interacting systems the force done (sensed) by the first system is equal to the force done (sensed) by any other. 
- To allow for the functioning of the world, force chains must be closed: this can happen immediately for some 
systems (think to two hands pulling a spring), but must finally happen in all situations (by the intervention of 
the, always physical, “reference systems”). 
- A measuring instrument is a particular system which, when iserted into a chain of different systems doing-
force, transmits the force and at the same time “transduces” its deformation into an easily observed (more or less 
linear) external change. 
- Some systems (as living systems, motors, etc) can be seen as “active” systems: they can be internally 
controlled in their doing force, this way “constraining” the interacting systems to do force at equal and opposite 
rates in all interaction regions. Other systems (a spring, a plastic object, a gravity or magnetic field …) can be 
seen as “reactive” systems: to them, physical configurations (and configuration changes) are univocally 
correlated to their doing force. 
- The relative motion between two systems (eventually, one of them a reference system) is itself a system 
subjected to the same, above specified, interacting rules: its “natural equilibrium” state just being the “unform 
motion” state. 
- ……………………………………………………………………………………………          
- Energy aspects can be introduced in two ways: i) inferring them from forces phenomenological rules, ii) 
developing them by a completely independent phenomenological path (in turn allowing to directly infer forces 
rules): what is crucial to the proposed approach is that at any level of understandig and representation the 
interlacing between “force” and “energy” ways-to-look-at the same physical facts (as their extension to 
momentum, angular momentum and so on) rests on “formal” (structurally universal) aspects. At any level, 
“mathematics” clearly appears as embedded in the same reality as “physics” is. 
- Iconic and schematic images illustrating this approach, together with an outline of its full formal development 
including motion phenomena, can be found in the Author’s lectures at the 2003 International School of Physics 
“Enrico Fermi”  (E. F. Redish and M. Vicentini Editors,  IOS Press – SIF, 2004).    
               (An approach to stimulate and to account for cognitive dynamics of students presented basic 
Thermodynamics at the level of the upper-secondary school, as developed within one of the research projects 
referring to this  cognitive model, is being proposed at this same Conference: see Levrini O. et al, A 
longitudinal approach to the appropriation of Science Ideas: a study on Students’ trajectories in 
Thermodynamics).   
5) As a conclusion: resonant hints from neurocognitive research 
Just to conclude, it seems interesting to notice that many cognitive dynamics hints, presented in recent years as 
results from quite diverse neurocognitive research strands, can in fact be seen as at resonance with the model 
presented here, which has been (continues to be) developed and validated by completely different (totally 
“phenomenological”) methods.    
 
